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Abstract
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect
public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an
informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain
a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilib-
rium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that
result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private
beliefs, so that the informed player’s reputation is private. We also show
that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and
that reputations disappear in sufﬁciently long discounted ﬁnitely-repeated
games. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers C70, C78.
Keywords: Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commit-
ment, Private Beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Reputation games capture settings in which a long-lived player beneﬁts from the
perception that her characteristics may be different than they actually are. Rep-
utation effects arise most cleanly when a long-lived player faces a sequence of
short-lived players who believe the long-lived player might be committed to the
stage-game “Stackelberg” action. In such a setting, the Stackelberg payoff pro-
vides a lower bound on the long-lived player’s average payoff, provided she is
sufﬁciently patient (Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1992)).
In an earlier paper (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004)), we showed that
if monitoring is imperfect and the reputation of the long-lived player is public,
meaning that the public signals allow the long-lived player to infer the short-lived
players’ beliefs about the long-lived player’s type, then reputation effects eventu-
ally disappear. Almost surely, the short-lived player eventually learns the type of
the long-lived player.
Many long-run relationships involve two (or more) long-lived players. Rep-
utation effects arise in this setting as well, and can be more powerful than when
the uninformed player is short-lived. Intertemporal incentives can induce the un-
informed agent to choose actions even more advantageous to the informed long-
lived player than the myopic best reply to the Stackelberg action (Celentani, Fu-
denberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1996)). In addition, it is natural for an analysis
of long-lived uninformed players to encompass private reputations: the actions
of both players are not only imperfectly monitored, but the monitoring need not
have the special structure required for the informed player to infer the uninformed
player’s beliefs. Instead, the uninformed player’s beliefs can depend critically on
his own past actions, which the informed player cannot observe.1
In this paper, we show that reputations eventually disappear when the unin-
formed player is long-lived and beliefs are private.2 We also improve on our
1For example, the inferences a ﬁrm draws from market prices may depend upon the ﬁrm’s
output choices, which others do not observe. Because private reputations arise when the unin-
formed player privately observes his own past actions, they occur most naturally with a single,
long-lived uninformed player rather than a sequence of short-lived players. In Cripps, Mailath,
and Samuelson (2004), we assumed that the short-run player’s actions are public, allowing a nat-
ural interpretation of the assumption that short-run players’ observed their predecessors’ actions,
but also ensuring that player 1’s reputation (player 2’s belief) is public.
2Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, Theorem 6) is a partial result for the case of a long-
lived uninformed player whose beliefs are public. That result is unsatisfactory, even for the public-
reputation case, in that it imposes a condition on the behavior of the long-lived uninformed player
in equilibrium. See footnote 5 for more details.July 28, 2004 2
earlier paper by showing that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform
across equilibria (Theorem 3), and that reputations disappear in sufﬁciently long
discounted ﬁnitely-repeated games (Theorem 4).
In our analysis, the long-lived informed player (player 1) may be a commit-
ment type that plays an exogenously speciﬁed strategy or a normal type that max-
imizes expected payoffs. We show that if the commitment strategy is not an equi-
libriumstrategyforthenormaltypeinthecomplete-informationgame, theninany
Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information repeated game, almost surely the
uninformed player (player 2) will learn that a normal long-lived player is indeed
normal. Thus, a long-lived player cannot indeﬁnitely maintain a reputation for
behavior that is not credible given her type.
Establishing such a result for the case of public reputations and short-lived
uninformed players is relatively straightforward (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuel-
son (2004)). Since monitoring is imperfect, deviations from equilibrium play by
player 1 cannot be unambiguously detected by player 2, precluding the trigger-
strategyequilibriathatsupportpermanentreputationsinperfect-monitoringgames.
Instead, the long-run convergence of beliefs ensures that eventually any current
signal of play has an arbitrarily small effect on player 2’s beliefs. Thus, when rep-
utations are public, player 1 eventually knows that player 2’s beliefs have nearly
converged and hence that playing differently from the commitment strategy will
incur virtually no cost in terms of altered beliefs. Coupled with discounting, this
ensures that deviations from the commitment strategy have virtually no effect on
the payoffs from continuation play. But the long-run effect of many such devia-
tions from the commitment strategy would be to drive the equilibrium to full reve-
lation. Public reputations can thus be maintained only if the gains from deviating
from the commitment strategy are arbitrarily small, that is, only if the reputation
is for behavior that is part of an equilibrium of the complete-information game
corresponding to the long-lived player’s type.3
The situation is more complicated in the private-reputation case, where player
2’s beliefs are not known by player 1. Now, player 1 may not know when de-
viations from the commitment strategy have relatively little effect on beliefs and
hence are relatively costless. Making the leap from the preceding intuition to
our main result thus requires showing that there is a set of histories under which
player 2’s beliefs have nearly converged, and under which player 1 is eventually
3This argument does not carry over to repeated games without discounting, where small
changes in beliefs, with implications only for distant behavior, can still have large payoff im-
plications.July 28, 2004 3
relatively certain player 2 has such beliefs.
In general, one cannot expect player 1’s beliefs about player 2’s beliefs to be
very accurate when the latter depend on private histories. A key step in our proof
is to show that whenever player 2’s private history induces him to act as if he is
convinced of some important characteristic of player 1, eventually player 1 must
become convinced that such a private history did indeed occur (Lemma 3). In
particular, if this private history ensured that player 2 is almost convinced that he
faces a commitment type, and acts on this belief, then this eventually becomes
known to player 1.
As in the case where player 1’s reputation is public, the impermanence of rep-
utation also arises at the behavioral level. Asymptotically, continuation play in
every Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information
game (Theorem 5). While the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the game with
complete information is potentially very large when player 2 is sufﬁciently pa-
tient (suggesting that limiting behavior to that set imposes few restrictions), we
emphasize that our analysis holds for all degrees of patience of the players. When
player 2 is impatient, as in the extreme case of short-run player 2s, reputations can
ensure payoffs for player 1 that cannot be obtained under complete information.
Our result (that limiting behavior must be consistent with complete information)
shows that this effect is transitory.
More importantly, reputation arguments are also of interest for their ability to
restrict, rather than expand, the set of equilibrium outcomes. For example, repu-
tation arguments are important in perfect-monitoring games with patient players,
precisely because they impose tight bounds on (rather than expanding) the set of
equilibrium payoffs. Our results caution that one cannot assume that such selec-
tion effects are long-lasting.
For expositional clarity, this paper considers a long-lived informed player who
can be one of two possible types—a commitment and a normal type—facing a
single long-lived uninformed player, in a game of imperfect public monitoring.
The argument of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, Section 6.1) can be used
to extend our results to many possible commitment types. The ﬁnal section of this
paper explains how our results can be extended to the case of private monitoring
(where reputations are necessarily private).
Our analysis subsumes a private-reputation model with a sequence of short-
lived uninformed players. In several places, the arguments for the latter case are
simpler and considerably more revealing, primarily because we can then restrict
attention to simpler commitment strategies. Accordingly, where appropriate, we
give the simpler argument for short-lived uninformed players as well as the moreJuly 28, 2004 4
involved argument for the long-lived uninformed player.
2 The Complete-Information Game
We begin with an inﬁnitely repeated game with imperfect public monitoring. The
stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move ﬁnite game of public monitoring.
Player 1 chooses an action i ∈ {1,2,...,I} ≡ I and player 2 chooses an action
j ∈ {1,2,...,J} ≡ J. The public signal, y, is drawn from the ﬁnite set Y . The
probability that y is realized under the action proﬁle (i,j) is given by ρ
y
ij. The ex
post stage-game payoff to player 1 (respectively, 2) from the action i (resp., j) and










We assume the public signals have full support (Assumption 1), so every sig-
nal y is possible after any action proﬁle. We also assume that with sufﬁciently
many observations, either player can correctly identify, from the frequencies of
the signals, any ﬁxed stage-game action of their opponent (Assumptions 2 and 3).
Assumption 1 (FULL SUPPORT) ρ
y
ij > 0 for all (i,j) ∈ I × J and y ∈ Y .
Assumption 2 (IDENTIFICATION OF 1) For all j ∈ J, the I columns in the ma-
trix (ρ
y
ij)y∈Y,i∈I are linearly independent.
Assumption 3 (IDENTIFICATION OF 2) Foralli ∈ I, theJ columnsinthematrix
(ρ
y
ij)y∈Y,j∈J are linearly independent.
The stage game is inﬁnitely repeated. Player 1 (“she”) is a long-lived player
with discount factor δ1 < 1. Player 2 (“he”) is either short-lived, in which case
a new player 2 appears in each period, or is also long-lived, in which case player
2’s discount factor δ2 may differ from δ1. Each player observes the realizations
of the public signal and his or her own past actions. (If player 2 is short-lived,
he observes the actions chosen by the previous player 2’s). Player 1 in period
t thus has a private history, consisting of the public signals and her own past
actions, denoted by h1t ≡ ((i0,y0),(i1,y1),...,(it−1,yt−1)) ∈ H1t ≡ (I × Y )
t.
Similarly, a private history for player 2 is denoted h2t ≡ ((j0,y0),(j1,y1),...,
(jt−1,yt−1)) ∈ H2t ≡ (J × Y )
t. The public history observed by both players is
the sequence (y0,y1,...,yt−1) ∈ Y t. The ﬁltration on (I × J × Y )∞ induced
by the private histories of player ` = 1,2 is denoted {H`t}∞
t=0, while the ﬁltration
induced by the public histories (y0,y1,...,yt−1) is denoted {Ht}∞
t=0.July 28, 2004 5
In Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004), we assumed that the public signal
included player 2’s action. This ensures that player 1 knows everything player
2 does, including player 2’s beliefs. Here, only player 2 observes his action,
breaking the link between 2’s beliefs and 1’s beliefs about those beliefs.
The long-lived players’ payoffs in the inﬁnite horizon game are the averaged




`π`(iτ,jτ) for ` = 1,2.
The random variable π`t denotes average discounted payoffs in period t,






If player 2 is short-lived, the period-t player 2 has payoffs π2(it,jt).
A behavior strategy for player 1 (respectively, 2) is a map, σ1 : ∪∞
t=0H1t → ∆I
(resp., σ2 : ∪∞
t=0H2t → ∆J), from all private histories to the set of distributions
overcurrentactions. For` = 1,2, σ` deﬁnesasequenceoffunctions{σ`t}∞
t=0 with
σ1t : H1t → ∆I and σ2t : H2t → ∆J. Each function σ`t denotes the tth period
behavior strategy of σ`. The strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2) induces a probability
distribution P σ over (I×J ×Y )∞. Let Eσ[ · | H`t] denote player `’s expectations
with respect to this distribution conditional on H`t.
A Nash equilibrium for the case of two long-lived players requires player `’s
strategy to maximize the expected value of π`0, the discounted value of payoffs in
period zero:
Deﬁnition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with a long-
lived player 2 is a strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2) such that Eσ[π10] ≥ E(σ0
1,σ2)[π10]
for all σ0
1 and Eσ[π20] ≥ E(σ1,σ0
2)[π20] for all σ0
2.
This requires that under the equilibrium proﬁle, player `’s strategy maximizes
continuation expected utility after any positive-probability history. For example,
for player 1, Eσ[π1t|H1t] ≥ E(σ0
1,σ2)[π1t|H1t] P σ-almost surely for all σ0
1 and all
t. The assumption of full-support monitoring ensures that all histories of public
signals occur with positive probability, and hence must be followed by optimal
behavior in any Nash equilibrium (with long-lived or short-lived player 2’s, and
complete or incomplete information). Consequently, any Nash equilibrium out-
come is also the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
For future reference, when player 2 is long-lived,
BR






is the set of player 2’s best replies to σ1 in the game with complete information.July 28, 2004 6
When player 2 is short-lived, in equilibrium, player 2 plays a best response
after every equilibrium history. Player 2’s strategy σ2 is then a best response to σ1
if, for all t,
E
σ[ π2(it,jt) | H2t] ≥ E
σ[ π2(it,j) | H2t], ∀j ∈ J P
σ-a.s.
Denote the set of such best responses by BRS(σ1). The deﬁnition of a Nash
equilibrium for this case is:
Deﬁnition 2 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with a short-
lived player 2 is a strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2) such that Eσ[π10] ≥ E(σ0
1,σ2)[π10]
for all σ0
1 and σ2 ∈ BRS(σ1).
3 The Incomplete-Information Game: Disappear-
ing Reputations
We now perturb the complete-information game by introducing incomplete infor-
mation about the type of player 1. At time t = −1, Nature selects a type of player
1. With probability 1 − p0 > 0, she is the “normal” type, denoted by n and with
the preferences described above, who plays a repeated game strategy ˜ σ1. With
probability p0 > 0, she is a “commitment” type, denoted by c, who plays the
repeated game strategy ˆ σ1.
A state of the world in the incomplete information game, ω, is a type for
player 1 and a sequence of actions and signals. The set of states is Ω ≡ {n,c} ×
(I × J × Y )
∞. The prior p0, the commitment strategy ˆ σ1, and the strategy proﬁle
˜ σ = (˜ σ1,σ2), jointly induce a probability measure P on Ω, which describes how
an uninformed player expects play to evolve. The strategy proﬁle ˆ σ = (ˆ σ1,σ2)
(respectively, ˜ σ = (˜ σ1,σ2)) determines a probability measure ˆ P (resp., ˜ P) on
Ω, which describes how play evolves when player 1 is the commitment (resp.,
normal) type. Since ˜ P and ˆ P are absolutely continuous with respect to P, any
statement that holds P-almost surely, also holds ˜ P- and ˆ P-almost surely. We use
E(˜ σ1,ˆ σ1,σ2)[· ] to denote expectations taken with respect to the measure P. This
will usually be abbreviated to E[· ] except where it is important to emphasize the
dependence on the strategies. Also, where appropriate, we use ˜ E[· ] and ˆ E[· ] to
denote the expectations taken with respect to ˜ P and ˆ P (instead of E(˜ σ1,σ2)[· ] and
E(ˆ σ1,σ2)[· ]). The ﬁltrations {H`t}∞
t=0 and {Ht}∞
t=0 will be viewed as ﬁltrations on
Ω in the obvious way.July 28, 2004 7
Thenormaltypeofplayer1hasthesameobjectivefunctionasinthecomplete-
information game. Player 2, on the other hand, uses the information he has ac-
quired from his time t private history to update his beliefs about player 1’s type
and actions, and then maximizes expected payoffs. Player 2’s posterior belief in
period t that player 1 is the commitment type is the H2t-measurable random vari-
able P(c|H2t) ≡ pt : Ω → [0,1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes’ rule determines this
posterior after all histories. At any Nash equilibrium of this game, the belief pt
is a bounded martingale with respect to the ﬁltration {H2t}t and measure P. It
therefore converges P-almost surely (and hence ˜ P- and ˆ P-almost surely) to a ran-
dom variable p∞ deﬁned on Ω. Furthermore, at any equilibrium the posterior pt is
a ˆ P-submartingale and a ˜ P-supermartingale with respect to the ﬁltration {H2t}t.
3.1 Uninformed Player is Short-Lived
When player 2 is short-lived, and we are interested in the lower bounds on player
1’s ex ante payoffs that arise from the existence of “Stackelberg” commitment
types (as in Fudenberg and Levine (1992)), it sufﬁces to consider commitment
types who follow “simple” strategies. Consequently, when player 2 is short-lived,
we assume ˆ σ1 speciﬁes the same (possibly mixed) action ς1 ∈ ∆I in each period
independent of history (cf. Deﬁnition 4 below).
If ς1 is part of a stage-game equilibrium, reputations need not disappear—
we need only consider an equilibrium in which the normal and commitment type
both play ς1, and player 2 plays his part of the corresponding equilibrium. We are
interestedincommitmenttypeswhoplayastrategythatisnot partofastage-game
equilibrium:4
Assumption 4 (NON-CREDIBLE COMMITMENT) Player 2 has a unique best re-
ply to ς1 (denoted ς2) and ς ≡ (ς1,ς2) is not a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
Since ς2 is the unique best response to ς1, ς2 is pure and BRS(ˆ σ1) is the sin-
gleton {ˆ σ2}, where ˆ σ2 is the strategy of playing ς2 in every period. Assumption 4
impliesthat(ˆ σ1, ˆ σ2)isnotaNashequilibriumofthecomplete-informationinﬁnite
horizon game.
4If player 2 has multiple best responses, it is possible to construct equilibria of the complete
information game in which player 1 always plays ς1 in each period, irrespective of history, even
if ς1 is not part of a stage-game equilibrium (for an example, see Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson
(2004, Section 2)).July 28, 2004 8
Deﬁnition 3 A Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with short-
lived uninformed players is a strategy proﬁle (˜ σ1,σ2) such that for all σ0
1, j ∈ J
and t = 0,1,...,
˜ E [π10] ≥ E
(σ0
1,σ2) [π10], and
E[ π2(it,jt) | H2t] ≥ E[ π2(it,j) | H2t], P−a.s.
Our main result, for short-lived uninformed players, is that reputations for
non-equilibrium behavior are temporary:
Theorem 1 Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and
3 and the commitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 4. In any Nash equilibrium
of the incomplete-information game with short-lived uninformed players, pt → 0
˜ P-almost surely.
3.2 Uninformed Player is Long-Lived
When player 2 is long-lived, non-simple Stackelberg types may give rise to higher
lower bounds on player 1’s payoff than do simple types. We accordingly introduce
a richer set of possible commitment types, allowing arbitrary public strategies.
Deﬁnition 4 (1) A behavior strategy σ`, ` = 1,2, is public if it is measurable with
respect to the ﬁltration induced by the public signals, {Ht}t.
(2) A behavior strategy σ`, ` = 1,2, is simple if it is a constant function.
A public strategy induces a mixture over actions in each period that only depends
on public histories. Any pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public strat-
egy. Simple strategies, which we associated with the commitment type in Section
3.1, play the same mixture over stage-game actions in each period, and hence are
trivially public.
Allowing the commitment type to play any public strategy necessitates im-
posing the noncredibility requirement directly on the inﬁnitely repeated game of
complete information. Mimicking Assumption 4, we require that (i) player 2’s
best response ˆ σ2 be unique on the equilibrium path and (ii) there exists a ﬁnite
time T o such that, for every t > T o, a normal player 1 would almost surely want
to deviate from ˆ σ1, given player 2’s best response. That is, there is a period-t
continuation strategy for player 1 that strictly increases her utility. A strategy ˆ σ1
satisfying these criteria at least eventually loses its credibility, and hence is said to
have “no long-run credibility.”July 28, 2004 9
Deﬁnition 5 The strategy ˆ σ1 has no long-run credibility if there exists T o and
εo > 0 such that, for every t ≥ T o,
(1) ˆ σ2 ∈ BRL(ˆ σ1) implies that with P (ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2)-probability one, ˆ σ2t is pure and
E
ˆ σ [ π2t | H2t ] > E
(ˆ σ1,σ0
2) [ π2t | H2t ] + ε
o,
for all σ0
2 attaching probability zero to the action played by ˆ σ2t(h2t) after P (ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2)-
almost all h2t ∈ H2t, and
(2) there exists ˜ σ1 such that, for ˆ σ2 ∈ BRL(ˆ σ1), P (ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2)-almost surely,
E
(˜ σ1,ˆ σ2) [ π1t | H1t ] > E
ˆ σ [ π1t | H1t ] + ε
o.
This deﬁnition captures the two main features of Assumption 4, a unique best
response and absence of equilibrium, in a dynamic setting. In particular, the stage-
game action of any simple strategy satisfying Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes Assumption 4.
In assuming the best response is unique, we need to avoid the possibility that
there are multiple best responses to the commitment action “in the limit” (as t
gets large). We do so by imposing a uniformity condition in Deﬁnition 5.1, that
inferior responses reduce payoffs by at least εo. The condition on the absence
of equilibrium in Deﬁnition 5.2 similarly ensures that for all large t, player 1
can strictly improve on the commitment action. Again it is necessary to impose
uniformity to avoid the possibility of an equilibrium in the limit.5
Any ˆ σ1 that does not satisfy Deﬁnition 5 must have (at least in the limit) peri-
ods and histories where, given player 2 is best responding to ˆ σ1, player 1 prefers
to stick to her commitment. In other words, ˆ σ1 is a credible commitment, in the
limit, at least some of the time.
Equilibrium when the uninformed player is long-lived is:
Deﬁnition 6 ANashequilibriumoftheincomplete-informationgamewithalong-
lived uninformed player is a strategy proﬁle (˜ σ1,σ2) such that,
˜ E [π10] ≥ E
(σ0









strategy satisﬁes the second, but not necessarily the ﬁrst, condition (such a strategy was said to be
never an equilibrium strategy in the long run). However, that result also requires the commitment
strategy to be implementable by a ﬁnite automaton, and more problematically, the result itself
imposed a condition on the behavior of player 2 in the equilibrium of the game with incomplete
information. We do neither here. Consequently, unlike our earlier paper, the long-lived player
result implies the result for short-lived players.July 28, 2004 10
Our result for games where player 2 is long-lived, which implies Theorem 1,
is:
Theorem 2 Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and that the commitment
type’s strategy ˆ σ1 is public and has no long run credibility. Then in any Nash
equilibrium of the game with incomplete information, pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
We have followed the standard practice of working with commitment types
whose behavior is ﬁxed. If we instead modeled commitment types as strate-
gic agents whose payoffs differed from those of normal types, we would obtain
the following: Under Assumptions 1–3, in any Nash equilibrium in which the
“commitment-payoff” type plays a public strategy with no long run credibility for
the “normal-payoff” type, pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
3.3 Uniform Disappearance of Reputations
Theorem 2 leaves open the possibility that while reputations do asymptotically
disappear in every equilibrium, for any period T, there may be equilibria in which
reputations survive beyond T. We show here that that possibility cannot arise:
there is some T after which reputations have disappeared in all Nash equilibria.
Intuitively, a sequence of Nash equilibria with reputations persisting beyond pe-
riod T → ∞ implies the (contradictory) existence of a limiting Nash equilibrium
with a permanent reputation.
Theorem 3 Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and that the commit-
ment type’s strategy ˆ σ1 is public and has no long run credibility. For all ε > 0,





t < ε, ∀t > T) > 1 − ε,
where ˜ P σ is the probability measure induced on Ω by σ and the normal type, and
pσ
t is the associated posterior of player 2 on the commitment type.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists ε > 0 such that for all T, there is a




t < ε, ∀t > T) ≤ 1 − ε,
where ˜ P T is the measure induced by the normal type under σT and pT
t is the
posterior in period t under σT.July 28, 2004 11
Since the space of strategy proﬁles is sequentially compact in the product
topology, there is a convergent subsequence {σTk}, with limit σ∗. We can relabel









t ≥ ε for some t > k) ≥ ε.
Since each σk is a Nash equilibrium, pk
t → 0 ˜ P k-a.s. (Theorem 2), and so




t < ε, ∀t ≥ Kk) ≤ 1 − ε/2.




t ≥ ε, for some t, k < t < Kk) ≥ ε/2.
Let τk denote the stopping time










t, if t < τk,
ε, if t ≥ τk.
Note that qk
t is a supermartingale under ˜ P k and that for t < k, qk
t = pk
t.
Observe that for all k and t ≥ Kk,
˜ Eq
k
t ≥ ε ˜ P
k(τk ≤ t) ≥ ε
2/2.
Since σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, p∗
t → 0 ˜ P ∗-a.s. (appealing to Theorem 2
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But since k0 > s, qk
s = pk

















which is a contradiction.
3.4 Disappearingreputationsindiscountedﬁnitely-repeatedgames
In this section we show that reputations also disappear in sufﬁciently long dis-
counted ﬁnitely-repeated games of incomplete information. We ﬁrst describe the
ﬁnitely repeated game with incomplete information. If the commitment type plays
a simple strategy of playing ς1 in every period, with ς1 satisfying Assumption
4, then the description of the ﬁnitely repeated game for differing repetitions is
straightforward: The commitment type plays ς1 in every period. More generally,
if ˆ σ
T
1 is the commitment type’s strategy in the T-period game, we require that the
sequence {ˆ σ
T
1} converge to a strategy ˆ σ1 of the inﬁnitely repeated game that has
no long-run credibility.
Theorem 4 Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, and ˆ σ1 is a public strat-
egy of the inﬁnitely repeated game with no long run credibility. Let GT denote the
T-period repeated game of incomplete information in which the commitment type
plays according to ˆ σ
T
1. Suppose for all t, ˆ σ
T
1t → ˆ σ1t as T → ∞. For all ε > 0,




t < ε, ∀t ≥ T) > 1 − ε,
where ˜ P σ is the probability measure induced on (I × J × Y )
T0
by σ and the nor-
mal type, and pσ
t is the associated posterior of player 2 on the commitment type.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists ε > 0, such that for all T, there exists




t < ε, ∀t ≥ T) ≤ 1 − ε,July 28, 2004 13
where ˜ P T is the probability measure induced in the T 0-period repeated game by
σT and the normal type, and pT
t is the associated posterior.
A standard diagonalization argument yields a subsequence {σTk} and a strat-




`t for ` = 1,2.6 Moreover, since each σTk is a Nash equilibrium of in-
creasingly long ﬁnitely repeated games and ˆ σ
Tk
1t → ˆ σ1t, σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium
of the inﬁnitely repeated game with incomplete information in which the com-
mitment type plays ˆ σ1. We can relabel this sequence so that σk
t → σ∗





t < ε, ∀t > k) ≤ 1 − ε.
Letting Tk be the length of the ﬁnitely repeated game corresponding to σk, we




t ≥ ε, for some t, k < t < Tk) ≥ ε.
The proof now proceeds as that of Theorem 3, with (2) evaluated at t = Tk−1.
3.5 Asymptotic Equilibrium Play
The impermanence of reputations has implications for behavior as well as beliefs.
In the limit, the normal type of player 1 and player 2 play a correlated equilib-
rium of the complete-information game. Hence, differences in the players’ beliefs
about how play will continue vanish in the limit. This is stronger than the con-
vergence to subjective equilibria obtained by Kalai and Lehrer (1995, Corollary
4.4.1),7 though with stronger assumptions.
We present the result for the case of a long-run player 2, since only straightfor-
ward modiﬁcations are required (imposing the appropriate optimality conditions
period-by-period) to address short-run player 2’s. To begin, we describe some
notation for the correlated equilibrium of the repeated game with imperfect mon-
itoring. We use the term period-t continuation game for the game with initial
period in period t.8 We use the notation t0 = 0,1,2,... for a period of play in a
6For each t, σ
Tk
t and σ∗
t are elements of the same ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space.
7In a subjective correlated equilibrium, the measure in (3) can differ from the measure in (4).
8Since a strategy proﬁle of the original game induces a probability distribution over t-period
histories, H1t ×H2t, we can view the period t continuation, together with a type space H1t ×H2t
and induced distribution on that type space, as a Bayesian game. Different strategy proﬁles in the
original game induce different distributions over the type space in the continuation game.July 28, 2004 14
continuation game (which may be the original game) and t for the time elapsed
prior to the start of the period-t continuation game. A pure strategy for player 1,
s1, is a sequence of maps s1t0 : H1t0 → I for t0 = 0,1,....9 Thus, s1t0 ∈ IH1t0 and
s1 ∈ I∪t0H1t0 ≡ S1, and similarly s2 ∈ S2 ≡ J∪t0H2t0. The spaces S1 and S2 are
countable products of ﬁnite sets. We equip the product space S ≡ S1 × S2 with
the σ-algebra generated by the cylinder sets, denoted by S. Denote the players’
payoffs in the inﬁnitely repeated game (as a function of these pure strategies) as
follows
u1(s1,s2) ≡ E
(s1,s2)[ π10 ], and
u2(s1,s2) ≡ E
(s1,s2)[ π20 ].
The expectation above is taken over the action pairs (it0,jt0). These are random,
given the pure strategy proﬁle (s1,s2), because the pure action played in period t
depends upon the random public signals.
We follow Hart and Schmeidler (1989) in using the ex ante deﬁnition of cor-
related equilibria for inﬁnite pure-strategy sets:
Deﬁnition 7 Acorrelatedequilibriumofthecomplete-informationgameisamea-
sure µ on (S,S) such that for all S-measurable functions ζ1 : S1 → S1 and
ζ2 : S2 → S2,
Z
S
[u1(s1,s2) − u1(ζ1(s1),s2)]dµ ≥ 0, and (3)
Z
S
[u2(s1,s2) − u2(s1,ζ2(s2))]dµ ≥ 0. (4)
Let M denote the space of probability measures µ on (S,S), equipped with
the product topology. Then, a sequence µn converges to µ if, for each τ ≥ 0, we
have
µn|I(I×Y )τ ×J(J×Y )τ → µ|I(I×Y )τ ×J(J×Y )τ.
Moreover, M is sequentially compact with this topology. Payoffs for players 1
and 2 are extended to M in the obvious way. Since payoffs are discounted, the
product topology is strong enough to guarantee continuity of u` : M →R. The
set of mixed strategies for player ` is denoted by M`.
Fix an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with imperfect mon-
itoring. When player 1 is the normal (respectively, commitment) type, the mon-
itoring technology and the behavior strategies (˜ σ1,σ2) (resp., (ˆ σ1,σ2)) induce a
9Recall that σ1 denotes general behavior strategies.July 28, 2004 15
probability measure ˜ φt (resp., ˆ φt) on the t-period histories (h1t,h2t) ∈ H1t ×H2t.
If the normal type of player 1 observes a private history h1t ∈ H1t, her strategy,
˜ σ1, speciﬁes a behavior strategy in the period-t continuation game. This behavior
strategy is realization equivalent to a mixed strategy ˜ λ
h1t ∈ M1 for the period-t
continuation game. Similarly, the commitment type will play a mixed strategy
ˆ λ
h1t
∈ M1 for the continuation game and player 2 will form his posterior pt(h2t)
and play the mixed strategy λ
h2t ∈ M2 in the continuation game. Conditional
on player 1 being normal, the composition of the probability measure ˜ φt and the
measures (˜ λ
h1t,λ
h2t) induces a joint probability measure, ˜ ρt, on the pure strategies
in the continuation game and player 2’s posterior (the space S ×[0,1]). Similarly,
conditional upon player 1 being the commitment type, there is a measure ˆ ρt on
S × [0,1]. Let ˜ µt denote the marginal of ˜ ρt on S and ˆ µt denote the marginal of ˆ ρt
on S.
At the ﬁxed equilibrium, the normal type is playing in an optimal way from
time t onwards given her available information. This implies that for all S-







Let S × B denote the product σ-algebra on S×[0,1] generated by S on S and the
Borel σ-algebra on [0,1]. Player 2 is also playing optimally from time t onwards,
which implies that for all S × B-measurable functions ξ2 : S2 × [0,1] → S2,
Z
S×[0,1]





If we had metrized M, a natural formalization of the idea that asymptoti-
cally, the normal type and player 2 are playing a correlated equilibrium is that
the distance between the set of correlated equilibria and the induced equilibrium
distributions ˜ µt on S goes to zero. While M is metrizable, a simpler and equiv-
alent formulation is that the limit of every convergent subsequence of {˜ µt} is a
correlated equilibrium. This equivalence is an implication of the fact that M is
sequentially compact, and hence every subsequence of {˜ µt} has a convergent sub-
subsequence. The proof of the following is in the Appendix:
Theorem 5 Fix a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game and sup-
pose pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely. Let ˜ µt denote the distribution on S induced inJuly 28, 2004 16
period t by the Nash equilibrium. The limit of every convergent subsequence of
{˜ µt} is a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game.
Since players have access to a coordination device, namely histories, in gen-
eral it is not true that Nash equilibrium play of the incomplete-information game
eventually looks like Nash equilibrium play of the complete-information game.10
Suppose the Stackelberg payoff is not a correlated equilibrium payoff of the
complete-information game. Recall that Fudenberg and Levine (1992) provide
a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs in the incomplete-information game (with
short-run players) of the following type: Fix the prior probability of the Stackel-
berg (commitment) type. Then, there is a value for the discount factor, ¯ δ, such that
if δ1 > ¯ δ, then in every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player’s ex ante payoff
is essentially no less than the Stackelberg payoff. The reconciliation of this re-
sult with Theorem 5 lies in the order of quantiﬁers: while Fudenberg and Levine
(1992) ﬁx the prior, p0, and then select ¯ δ (p0) large (with ¯ δ (p0) → 1 as p0 → 0),
we ﬁx δ1 and examine asymptotic play, so that eventually pt is sufﬁciently small
that δ1 < ¯ δ (pt).
4 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
The short-lived uninformed player case is a special case of the long-lived player
case. However, the proof for the long-lived uninformed player is quite compli-
cated, while the short-lived player case illustrates many of the issues in a simpler
setting. In what follows, references to the incomplete information game without
further qualiﬁcation refer to the game with the long-lived uninformed player, and
so the discussion also covers short-lived uninformed players (where ˆ σ1(hs) = ς1
for all hs). Whenever it is helpful, however, we also give informative simpler
arguments for the case of short-lived uninformed players.
The basic strategy of our proof is to show that if player 2 is not eventually
convinced that player 1 is normal, then he must be convinced that player 1 is
playing like the commitment type (Lemma 1) and hence player 2 plays a best
response to the latter. Our earlier paper proceeded by arguing that the normal type
10We do not know if Nash equilibrium play in the incomplete-information game eventually
looks like a public randomization over Nash equilibrium play in the complete-information game.
As far as we are aware, it is also not known whether the result of Fudenberg and Levine (1994,
Theorem 6.1, part (iii)) extends to correlated equilibrium. That is, for moral hazard mixing games
and for large δ, is it true that the long-run player’s maximum correlated equilibrium payoff is
lower than when monitoring is perfect?July 28, 2004 17
then has an incentive to deviate from the commitment strategy (since the latter has
no long-run credibility), which forms the basis for a contradiction (with player
2’s belief that the two types of player 1 are playing identically). The difﬁculty in
applying this argument in our current setting is that player 1 needs to know player
2’s private history h2t in order to predict 2’s period-t beliefs and hence behavior.
Unfortunately, player1knowsonlyherownprivatehistoryh1t. Ourargumentthus
requires showing that player 1 eventually “almost” knows the relevant features of
player 2’s history.
4.1 Player 2’s Posterior Beliefs
The ﬁrst step is to show that either player 2’s expectation (given his private his-
tory) of the strategy played by the normal type is, in the limit, identical to his
expectation of the strategy played by the commitment type, or player 2’s poste-
rior probability that player 1 is the commitment type converges to zero (given that
player 1 is indeed normal). This is an extension of a familiar merging-style argu-
ment to the case of imperfect monitoring. If, for a given private history for player
2, the distributions generating his observations are different for the normal and
commitment types, then he will be updating his posterior, continuing to do so as
the posterior approaches zero. His posterior converges to something strictly posi-
tive only if the distributions generating these observations are in the limit identical
for each private history.
The proof of Lemma 1 in Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) applies to
the current setting without change:
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed and ˆ σ1 is public. In any
Nash equilibrium of the game with incomplete information,11
lim
t→∞pt(1 − pt)
  ˆ σ1t − ˜ E[ ˜ σ1t | H2t ]
   = 0, P-a.s. (7)
Condition (7) says that almost surely either player 2’s best prediction of the
normal type’s behavior at the current stage is arbitrarily close to his best prediction
of the commitment type’s behavior (that is, kˆ σ1t − ˜ E[ ˜ σ1t | H2t ] k → 0), or the
type is revealed (that is, pt(1 − pt) → 0). However, limpt < 1 ˜ P-almost surely,
and hence (7) implies a simple corollary:
11We use kxk to denote the sup-norm on RI.July 28, 2004 18
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed and ˆ σ1 is public. In any




 ˆ σ1t − ˜ E[ ˜ σ1t | H2t ]

  = 0, ˜ P-a.s.
4.2 Player 2’s Beliefs about his Future Behavior
We now examine the consequences of the existence of a ˜ P-positive measure set
of states on which reputations do not disappear, i.e., limt→∞ pt(ω) > 0. The
normalandthecommitmenttypeseventuallyplaythesamestrategyonthesestates
(Lemma 1). Consequently, we can show that on a positive probability subset of
these states, player 2 eventually attaches high probability to the event that in all
future periods he will play a best response to the commitment type.
As ˆ σ1 ispublic, player2hasabestresponseto ˆ σ1 thatisalsopublic. Moreover,
this best response is unique on the equilibrium path for all t > T o (by Deﬁnition
5). We let j∗(ht) denote the action that is the pure best-response after the public
history ht, for all t > T o. Note that j∗(ht) is Ht-measurable. The event that player




t ≡ {ω : σ
j∗(hs(ω))
2s (h2s(ω)) = 1,∀s ≥ t},
wherehs(ω)(respectively, h2s(ω))isthes-periodpublic(resp., 2’sprivate)history
of ω.
When the uninformed players are short-lived, ˆ σ1 is simple and player 2 has a
unique best reply, BRS(ς1) = {ς2}, so
G
o
t = {ω : σ2s(h2s(ω)) = ς2,∀s ≥ t}.
With this in hand we can show that if player 2 does not eventually learn that
player 1 is normal, then he eventually attaches high probability to thereafter play-
ing a best response to the commitment type:
Lemma 2 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold,12 and suppose there is a
Nash equilibrium in which reputations do not necessarily disappear, i.e., ˜ P(A) >
0, where A ≡ {pt 9 0}. There exists η > 0 and F ⊂ A, with ˜ P(F) > 0, such
that, for any ξ > 0, there exists T for which, on F,
pt > η, ∀t ≥ T,




t | H2t) > 1 − ξ, ∀t ≥ T. (8)
Proof. Since ˜ P(A) > 0 and pt converges almost surely, there exists µ > 0 and
η > 0 such that ˜ P(D) > 2µ, where D ≡ {ω : limt→∞ pt(ω) > 2η}. The random
variables kˆ σ1s − ˜ E[˜ σ1t|H2t]k tend ˜ P-almost surely to zero on D (by Corollary
1). Consequently, the random variables Zt ≡ sups≥t kˆ σ1s − ˜ E[˜ σ1s|H2s]k also
converge ˜ P-almost surely to zero on D. Thus, from Hart (1985, Lemma 4.24),
˜ E[1DZt | H2t] converge almost surely to zero, where 1D is the indicator for the
event D. Deﬁne At ≡ {ω : ˜ E[1D | H2t](ω) > 1
2}. The H2t-measurable event At
approximates D (because player 2 knows his own beliefs, the random variables
dt ≡ |1D − 1At| converge ˜ P-almost surely to zero). Hence
1D ˜ E[Zt | H2t] ≤ 1At ˜ E[Zt | H2t] + dt
= ˜ E[1AtZt | H2t] + dt
≤ ˜ E[1DZt | H2t] + ˜ E[dt | H2t] + dt,
where the ﬁrst and third lines use Zt ≤ 1 and the second uses the measurability
of At with respect to H2t. All the terms on the last line converge ˜ P-almost surely
to zero, and so ˜ E[Zt|H2t] → 0 ˜ P-a.s. on the set D. Egorov’s Theorem (Chung
(1974, p. 74)) then implies that there exists F ⊂ D such that ˜ P(F) > 0 on which
the convergence of pt and ˜ E[Zt|H2t] is uniform.
To clarify the remainder of the argument, we present here the case of short-
lived player 2 (long-lived player 2 is discussed in Appendix A.2). This case is
particularly simple, because if player 2 believed his opponent was “almost” the
commitment type, then in each period 2 plays the same equilibrium action as if he
was certain he was facing the commitment simple type.
¿From the upper semi-continuity of the best response correspondence, there
exists ψ > 0 such that for any history h1s and any ζ1 ∈ ∆I satisfying kζ1 − ς1k ≤
ψ, a best response to ζ1 is also a best response to ς1, and so necessarily equals ς2.
The uniform convergence of ˜ E[Zt|H2t] on F implies that, for any ξ > 0, there






ς1 − ˜ E[˜ σ1s|H2s]
 

   H2t

< ξψ.
As ˜ E[Zt|H2t] < ξψ for all t > T on F and Zt ≥ 0, ˜ P({Zt > ψ}|H2t) < ξ for all
t > T on F, implying (8).July 28, 2004 20
4.3 Player 1’s Beliefs about Player 2’s Future Behavior
Our next step is to show that, with positive probability, player 1 eventually expects
player 2 to play a best response to the commitment type for the remainder of the
game. We ﬁrst show that, while player 2’s private history h2t is typically of use
to player 1 in predicting 2’s period-s behavior for s > t, this usefullness vanishes
as s → ∞. The intuition is straightforward. If period-s behavior is eventually
(as s becomes large) independent of h2t, then clearly h2t is eventually of no use
in predicting that behavior. Suppose then that h2t is essential to predicting player
2’s behavior in all periods s > t. Then, player 1 continues to receive information
about this history from subsequent observations, reducing the value of having h2t
explicitly revealed. As time passes player 1 will ﬁgure out whether h2t actually
occurred from her own observations, again reducing the value of independently
knowing h2t.
Denote by β(A,B) the smallest σ-algebra containing the σ-algebras A and B.
Thus, β (H1s,H2t) is the σ-algebra describing player 1’s information at time s if
she were to learn the private history of player 2 at time t.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. For any t > 0 and τ ≥ 0,
lim
s→∞
   ˜ E[σ2,s+τ|β(H1s,H2t)] − ˜ E[σ2,s+τ|H1s]
   = 0, ˜ P-a.s.
Proof. We prove the result here for τ = 0. The case of τ ≥ 1 is proved by
induction in Appendix A.3. Suppose K ⊂ Jt is a set of t-period player 2 action
proﬁles(j0,j1,...,jt−1). WealsodenotebyK thecorrespondingevent(i.e., subset
of Ω). By Bayes’ rule and the ﬁniteness of the action and signal spaces, we can
write the conditional probability of the event K given the observation by player 1
of h1,s+1 = (h1s,ys,is) as follows
˜ P[K|h1,s+1] = ˜ P[K|h1s,ys,is]
=

















where the last equality uses ˜ P [is|K,h1s] = ˜ P [is|h1s].July 28, 2004 21
Subtract ˜ P[K|h1s] from both sides to obtain


























2(h2s)|h1s] is player 1’s conditional probability of observing
the period-s signal ys given she takes action is and hence is strictly positive and
less than one by Assumption 1. Thus,
 
 ˜ P[K|h1,s+1] − ˜ P[K|h1s]
 


















Since the sequence of random variables { ˜ P[K|H1s]}s is a martingale relative to
({H1s}s, ˜ P), it converges ˜ P-almost surely to a non-negative limit ˜ P [K|H1∞] as
s → ∞. Consequently, the left side of this inequality converges ˜ P-almost surely
to zero. The signals generated by player 2’s actions satisfy Assumption 3, so an
identical argument to that given at the end of the proof of Lemma 1 in Cripps,




   ˜ E[σ2s|β (H1s,K)] − ˜ E[σ2s|H1s]
   = 0,
where β (A,B) is the smallest σ-algebra containing both the σ-algebra A and the




   ˜ E[σ2s|β(H1s,K)] − ˜ E[σ2s|H1s]
 
 = 0.
Since this holds for all K ∈ H2t,
lim
s→∞k ˜ E[σ2s|β(H1s,H2t)] − ˜ E[σ2s|H1s]k = 0, ˜ P-a.s.,
giving the result for τ = 0.
Now we apply Lemma 3 to a particular piece of information player 2 could
have at time t. By Lemma 2, with positive probability, we reach a time t at which
player 2 assigns high probability to the event that all his future behavior is a best
reply to the commitment type. Intuitively, by Lemma 3, these period-t beliefs ofJuly 28, 2004 22
player 2 about his own future behavior will, eventually, become known to player
1.
This step is motivated by the observation that, if player 1 eventually expects
player 2 to always play a best response to the commitment type, then the normal
type of player 1 will choose to deviate from the behavior of the commitment type
(which is not a best response to player 2’s best response to the commitment type).
At this point, we appear to have a contradiction between player 2’s belief on the
event F (from Lemma 2) that the normal and commitment types are playing iden-
tically and player 1’s behavior on the event F † (the event where player 1 expects
player 2 to always play a best response to the commitment type, identiﬁed in the
next lemma). This contradiction would be immediate if F † was both a subset of
F and measurable for player 2. Unfortunately we have no reason to expect either.
However, the next lemma shows that F † is in fact close to a H2s-measurable set
on which player 2’s beliefs that player 1 is the commitment type do not converge
to zero. In this case we will (eventually) have a contradiction: On all such histo-
ries, the normal and commitment types are playing identically. However, nearly
everywhere on a relatively large subset of these states, player 1 is deviating from
the commitment strategy in an identiﬁable way.
Recall that j∗(hs) is the action played for sure in period s after the public his-
toryhs byplayer2’sbestresponsetothecommitmenttype. Hence, ˜ E[σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 |H1s]
is the probability player 1 assigns in period s to the event that 2 best responds to
the commitment type in period s0 ≥ s. For the case of the short-lived unin-
formed players and the simple commitment type, j∗(hs) = ς2 for all hs,13 and
so
   ˜ E[σ2s0|H1s] − ς2
   ≥ 1 − ˜ E[σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 |H1s]. So, in that case, (12) implies

  ˜ E[σ2s0|H1s] − ς2

  < ν.
Lemma 4 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, and suppose there is a
Nashequilibriuminwhichreputationsdonotnecessarilydisappear, i.e., ˜ P({pt 9
0}) > 0. Let η > 0 be the constant and F the positive probability event identiﬁed
in Lemma 2. For any ν > 0 and number of periods τ > 0, there exists an event
F † and a time T(ν,τ) such that for all s > T(ν,τ) there exists C†
s ∈ H2s with:








†) > ˜ P(C
†
s) − ν ˜ P(F), (11)
13Here we use ς2 to denote the pure action receiving probability one under ς2.July 28, 2004 23
and for any s0 ∈ {s,s + 1,...,s + τ}, on F †,
˜ E[ σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 | H1s ] > 1 − ν, ˜ P-a.s. (12)
Proof. Fix ν ∈ (0,1) and a number of periods τ > 0. Fix ξ < (1
4ν ˜ P(F))2,
and let T denote the critical period identiﬁed in Lemma 2 for this value of ξ.
Player 1’s minimum estimated probability on j∗(hs0) over periods s,...,s+τ
can be written as fs ≡ mins≤s0≤s+τ ˜ E[σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 |H1s]. Notice that fs > 1 − ν is a
sufﬁcient condition for inequality (12).
The ﬁrst part of the proof is to ﬁnd a lower bound for fs. For any t ≤ s, the
triangle inequality implies








s ≡ maxs≤s0≤s+τ | ˜ E[σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 |β(H1s,H2t)]− ˜ E[σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 |H1s]| for t ≤ s. By
Lemma 3, lims→∞ kt
s = 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
As σ
j∗(hs0)
2s0 ≤ 1 and is equal to 1 on Go
t, the above implies
fs ≥ ˜ P (G
o
t | β(H1s,H2t)) − k
t
s.
Moreover, the sequence of random variables { ˜ P(Go
t|β(H1s,H2t))}s is a martin-
galewithrespecttotheﬁltration {H1s}s, andsoconvergesalmostsurelytoalimit,
gt ≡ ˜ P(Go
t|β(H1∞,H2t)). Hence







s ≡ |gt − ˜ P(Go
t|β(H1s,H2t))| and lims→∞ `t
s = 0 ˜ P-almost surely.
The second step of the proof determines the sets C†
s and a set that we will use
to later determine F †. For any t ≥ T, deﬁne
Kt ≡ {ω : ˜ P(G
o
t | H2t) > 1 − ξ , pt > η} ∈ H2t.
Let F s
t denote the event ∩s
τ=tKτ and set Ft ≡ ∩∞
τ=tKτ; note that liminf Kt ≡
∪∞
t=T ∩∞
τ=t Kτ = ∪∞
t=TFt. By Lemma 2, F ⊂ Kt for all t ≥ T, so F ⊂ F s
t ,
F ⊂ Ft, and F ⊂ liminf Kt.
Deﬁne Nt ≡ {ω : gt ≥ 1 −
√
ξ}. Set C†
s ≡ F s
T ∈ H2s and deﬁne an
intermediate set F ∗ by F ∗ ≡ FT ∩ NT. Because C†
s ⊂ Ks, (9) holds. In addition,
F ∗ ∪ F ⊂ C†
s, and hence (10) holds with F ∗ in the role of F †. By deﬁnition,
˜ P(C
†
s) − ˜ P(F
∗) = ˜ P(C
†
s ∩ (FT ∩ NT)) = ˜ P((C
†
s ∩ ¯ FT) ∪ (C
†
s ∩ ¯ NT)),July 28, 2004 24
where we use bars to denote complements. By our choice of C†
s, the event C†
s∩ ¯ NT
is a subset of the event KT ∩ ¯ NT. Thus, we have the bound
˜ P(C
†
s) − ˜ P(F
∗) ≤ ˜ P(C
†
s ∩ ¯ FT) + ˜ P(KT ∩ ¯ NT). (14)
We now ﬁnd upper bounds for the two terms on the right side of (14). First notice
that ˜ P(C†
s ∩ ¯ FT) = ˜ P(F s
T)− ˜ P(FT). Since lims→∞ ˜ P(F s
T) = ˜ P(FT), there exists
T 0 ≥ T such that
˜ P(C
†
s ∩ ¯ FT) <
√
ξ for all s ≥ T
0. (15)
Also, as ˜ P(Go
t|Kt) > 1 − ξ and Kt ∈ H2t, the properties of iterated expectations
imply that 1 − ξ < ˜ P(Go
t|Kt) = ˜ E[gt|Kt]. Since gt ≤ 1, we have
1 − ξ < ˜ E[g
t | Kt] ≤ (1 −
√
ξ) ˜ P( ¯ Nt | Kt) + ˜ P(Nt | Kt)
= 1 −
√
ξ ˜ P( ¯ Nt | Kt).
The extremes of the above inequality imply that ˜ P( ¯ Nt|Kt) <
√
ξ. Hence, taking
t = T we get
˜ P(KT ∩ ¯ NT) <
√
ξ. (16)
Using (15) and (16) in (14), ˜ P(C†
s) − ˜ P(F ∗) < 2
√
ξ for all s ≥ T 0. Given
F ⊂ C†
s, the bound on ξ, and ν < 1, it follows that
˜ P(F





˜ P(F) > 0.
Finally, we combine the two steps above to obtain F †. As ˜ P(F ∗) > 0 and
kT
s +`T
s converges almost surely to zero, by Egorov’s Theorem, there exists F † ⊂
F ∗ such that ˜ P(F ∗ \ F †) <
√





F † for all s ≥ T 00. Since F † ∪ F ⊂ F ∗ ∪ F ⊂ C†
s, (10) holds. Let T(ν,τ) ≡
max{T 00,T 0}. Also, gT ≥ 1 −
√
ξ on F †, because F † ⊂ NT. Hence on F †, by
(13), fs > 1 − 2
√
ξ for all s > T(ν,τ). This, and the bound on ξ, implies (12).
Moreover, as ˜ P(F ∗ \ F †) <
√
ξ and ˜ P(C†
s) − ˜ P(F ∗) < 2
√
ξ, (11) holds for all
s > T(ν,τ).
When player 2 is long-lived, it will be convenient to know that the conclusions
of Lemma 4 hold on a sequence of cylinder sets:
Corollary 2 AssumetheconditionsofLemma4. DeﬁneF †
s = {ω ∈ Ω : projs(ω) =
projs(ω0)forsomeω0 ∈ F †}, whereprojs(ω)istheprojectionofω onto(I × J × Y )
s.
Then, (10), (11), and (12) hold for F †
s replacing F †.




s ∈ H2s) and (12) is a condition that is H1s-measurable.July 28, 2004 25
4.4 Toward a Contradiction
We have shown that when reputations do not necessarily disappear, there exists a
set F † on which (12) holds and F † ⊂ C†
s ∈ H2s. The remaining argument is more
transparent in the setting of the short-lived player 2s of Theorem 1. Accordingly,
we ﬁrst prove Theorem 1, and then give the distinct argument needed when player
2 is long-lived and the commitment strategy is not simple.
In broad brushstrokes, the argument proving Theorem 1 is as follows. First,
we conclude that on F †, the normal type will not be playing the commitment
strategy. To be precise—on F † there will exist a stage-game action played by ς1
but not by the normal type. This will bias player 2’s expectation of the normal
type’s actions away from the commitment strategy on C†
s, because there is little
probability weight on C†
s \ F †. We then get a contradiction, because the fact that
ps > η on C†
s implies player 2 must believe the commitment type’s strategy and
the normal type’s average strategy are the same on C†
s.
The argument proving Theorem 2 must deal with the nonstationary nature of
the commitment strategy (and the nonstationary nature of the failure of credibil-
ity). As in the simple case, we have found a set of states F † where, for all s
sufﬁciently large, the normal type attaches high probability to player 2 best re-
sponding to the commitment type for the next τ periods. The normal type’s best
response to this is not the commitment strategy, and hence the normal type does
not play the commitment strategy. We will derive a contradiction by showing that
player 2 almost comes to know this.
The complication is that it may be very difﬁcult for player 2 to predict just how
the normal type’s strategy deviates from the commitment strategy. When working
with the stationary commitment strategy of Theorem 1, we can be certain there
is a stage-game action played by the commitment type which the normal type’s
strategy would (eventually) not play after any private history. In the setting of
Theorem 2, however, the normal type’s deviation from the nonstationary commit-
ment strategy may be much more complicated, and may depend on private (rather
than just public) information.
4.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose, en route to the contradiction, that there is a Nash equilibrium in which
reputations do not necessarily disappear. Then ˜ P({pt 9 0}) > 0. Let ς1 ≡
mini∈I{ςi
1 : ςi
1 > 0}, that is, ς1 is the smallest non-zero probability attached to an
action under the commitment strategy ς1. Since (ς1,ς2) is not a Nash equilibrium,July 28, 2004 26
ς1 plays an action that is suboptimal by at least γ > 0 when player 2 uses any
strategy sufﬁciently close to ς2. That is, there exists γ > 0, i0 ∈ I with ςi0
1 > 0 and










Finally, for a given discount factor δ1 < 1 there exists a τ sufﬁciently large such
that the loss of γ for one period is larger than any feasible potential gain deferred
by τ periods: (1 − δ1)γ > δ
τ
12maxij |π1(i,j)|.
Fix the event F from Lemma 2. For ν < min{¯ ν, 1
2ς1} and τ above, let F † and,
for s > T(ν,τ), C†
s be the events described in Lemma 4. Now consider the normal
type of player 1 in period s > T(ν,τ) at some state in F †. By (12), she expects
player 2 to play within ν < ¯ ν of ς2 for the next τ periods. Playing the action i0
is conditionally dominated in period s, since the most she can get from playing
i0 in period s is worse than playing a best response to ς2 for τ periods and then
being minmaxed. Thus, on F † the normal type plays action i0 with probability
zero: σi0
1s = 0.
Now we calculate a lower bound on the difference between player 2’s beliefs
about the normal type’s probability of playing action i0 in period s, ˜ E[σi0
1s|H2s],


























≥ ς1 ˜ P(C
†














s) − ˜ P(F
†)

≥ ς1 ˜ P(C
†




ς1 ˜ P(F). (17)
The ﬁrst inequality above follows from removing the absolute values. The second
inequality applies ςi0
1 ≥ ς1, uses the H2s-measurability of C†
s and applies the
properties of conditional expectations. The third applies the fact that σi0
1s = 0
on F † and σi0
1s ≤ 1. The fourth inequality applies (11) in Lemma 4. The ﬁfth
inequality follows ν < 1
2ς1 and F ⊂ C†
s (by (10)).
¿From Corollary 1, pskς1− ˜ E(˜ σ1s|H2s)k → 0 ˜ P-almost surely. It follows that
ps|ς
i0




s → 0, ˜ P−a.s.July 28, 2004 27








s → 0, ˜ P−a.s.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1, since we now have a contradiction with
˜ P(F) > 0 (from Lemma 2) and (17), which holds for all s > T(ν,τ).
4.6 Proof of Theorem 2
We ﬁrst argue that, after any sufﬁciently long public history, there is one continu-
ation public history after which the commitment type will play some action io ∈ I
with positive probability, but after which the normal type will choose not to play
io, regardless of her private history. To ﬁnd such a history, notice that ˆ σ2 (player
2’s best response to the commitment strategy) is pure and therefore public, ensur-
ing that the normal player 1 has a public best response to ˆ σ2 and that it is not ˆ σ1.
Hence, there exists a public history where 1’s public best response differs from the
commitment strategy, for all private histories consistent with this public history.
If we can show this preference is strict, this will still hold when player 2 is just
playing close to a best response, which will open the door to a contradiction. The
formal statement is (the proof is in Appendix A.4):
Lemma 5 Suppose ˆ σ1 is a public strategy with no long-run credibility (with an
associated T o), and ˆ σ2 is player 2’s public best reply. Then, player 1 has a public
best reply, σ
†
1, to ˆ σ2. There exists ˆ τ ∈ N, λ > 0, and κ > 0 such that for all
s > T o and each hs ∈ Hs, there is an action io, a period s0 ≤ s + ˆ τ, and a public
continuation history ho









3. player 1’s payoff from playing io and continuing with strategy ˆ σ1 is at least














For s > T o, Lemma 5 describes how player 1’s best response to ˆ σ2 differs
from ˆ σ1. In the game with incomplete information, Lemma 5 deﬁnes three Hs-
measurable functions, i(·;s) : Ω → I, s0(·;s) : Ω → {t : s ≤ t ≤ s + τ},July 28, 2004 28
and h(·;s) : Ω → ∪∞
t=0Y t as follows: Associated with each state ω ∈ Ω is the
implied s-period public history, hs. The action-period pair (i(ω;s),s0(ω;s)) is the
action-period pair (io,s0) from Lemma 5 for the public history hs. Finally, h(ω;s)
is the s0(ω;s)-period continuation history ho
s0 of hs from Lemma 5. We emphasize
that h(ω;s) is typically not the s0(ω;s)-period public history of ω (for a start, it is
Hs-measurable); while the ﬁrst s-periods of h(ω;s) are the s-period public history
of ω, the next s0(ω;s) − s periods describe the public signals from Lemma 5.
With these functions in hand, we can describe how player 1’s behavior differs
from that of the commitment type when she is sufﬁciently conﬁdent that player 2
is best responding to the commitment type (where ρ ≡ miny,i,j ρ
y
ij > 0 and λ is
from Lemma 5; the proof is in Appendix A.5):
Lemma 6 Suppose the hypotheses of Theorem 2 hold, and suppose there is a
Nashequilibriuminwhichreputationsdonotnecessarilydisappear, i.e., ˜ P({pt 9
0}) > 0. Let ˆ τ, λ, and κ be the constants identiﬁed in Lemma 5, and M ≡
maxi∈I,j∈J,`∈{1,2} |π`(i,j)|. Suppose τ > ˆ τ satisﬁes 12Mδ
τ
1 < κ, ν > 0 satisﬁes
12Mν < κρτ, and {F †
s}s is the sequence of events identiﬁed in Corollary 2. For




2. the set F ‡
s ≡ {ω ∈ F †
s : hs0(ω;s)(ω) = h(ω;s)} has probability ˜ P(F ‡
s) ≥
ρτ ˜ P(F †
s) > 0, and





If the events F ‡
s were known to player 2 in period s, then the argument is
now complete, since there would be a contradiction between player 2’s belief
that the normal and commitment type play the same way on F ‡
s and player 1’s
actual behavior. However, F ‡
s is not known to player 2. On the other hand, F ‡
s is
approximated by C‡
s (the analogous modiﬁcation of C†
s, deﬁned below), an event
known by player 2 in period s. At the same time, we must still deal with the
random nature of i(·;s) and s0(·;ω).
To complete the argument then, suppose the assumptions of Lemma 6 (includ-
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The set of states consistent with 2’s information at time s, C†
s, and the “right”
continuation public history, is C‡
s ≡ {ω ∈ C†
s : hs0(ω)(ω) = h(ω;s)}. Note that
˜ P(C‡
s\F ‡
s) ≤ ˜ P(C†
s\F †
s), and since C†
s ⊃ F †
s, C‡
s ⊃ F ‡
s. We also partition C‡
s into
the subevents corresponding to the relevant period in which the action i = i(ω;s)
is not optimal: C‡it
s ≡ {ω ∈ C†





s . Note that C‡it
s ∈ H2t for all i ∈ I and t = s,...,s + τ.
For each ω, let io = i(ω;s) and so = s0(ω;s). Now, for ﬁxed ω and implied
ﬁxedactionio andperiodso, deﬁne ˆ fs(ω) ≡ ˆ σ
io












conditional expected value of ˜ σio
1so. In particular, for ω ∈ C‡it
s , so = t and
io = i, and we can write ˆ fs(ω) ≡ ˆ σ
i







  ˆ σ1t − ˜ E [˜ σ1t|H2t]
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s] ≥ ˜ E
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where the last equality follows from C‡t
s ∈ H2t. Now, deﬁne F ‡it
s ≡ {ω ∈ F †
s :
i(ω;s) = i, s0(ω;s) = t, ht(ω) = h(ω;s)}, and so F ‡
s = ∪
s+τ














































































> λ ˜ P(F
‡
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= 0 ˜ P-almost surely.






s) − ( ˜ P(C
†
s) − ˜ P(F
†
s)). (22)
Applying the bounds ν ˜ P(F) > ˜ P(C†
s)− ˜ P(F †
s) and ˜ P(F †
s) > ˜ P(F)(1−ν) from




τ(1 − ν) − ν) ˜ P(F).








s) > ρτ(1 − ν) ˜ P(F) > 0 and since C‡
s ⊂ {ω : pt 9 0},
Zs1C
‡
s → 0 ˜ P-almost surely, the desired contradiction.
5 Imperfect Private Monitoring
In this section, we brieﬂy sketch how our results can be extended to the case
of private monitoring. Instead of observing a public signal y at the end of each
period, player 1 observes a private signal θ (drawn from a ﬁnite set Θ) and player
2 observes a private signal ζ (drawn from a ﬁnite set Z). A history for a player
is the sequence of his or her actions and private signals. Given the underlying
action proﬁle (i,j), we let ρij denote a probability distribution over Θ × Z. We
use ρ
θζ
ij to denote the probability of the signal proﬁle (θ,ζ) conditional on (i,j).











ij . The case of public
monitoring is a special case: take Θ = Z and Σθ∈Θρθθ
ij = 1 for all i, j.
We now describe the analogs of our earlier assumptions on the monitoring
technology. The full-support assumption is:
Assumption 5 (FULL SUPPORT) ρθ
ij,ρ
ζ
ij > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, ζ ∈ Z, and all
(i,j) ∈ I × J.
Note that we do not assume that ρ
θζ
ij > 0 for all (i,j) ∈ I × J and (θ,ζ) ∈ Θ2
(which would rule out public monitoring). Instead, the full-support assumption is
that each signal is observed with positive probability under every action proﬁle.July 28, 2004 31
Assumption 6 (IDENTIFICATION 1) For all j ∈ J, the I columns in the matrix
(ρ
ζ
ij)ζ∈Z,i∈I are linearly independent.
Assumption 7 (IDENTIFICATION 2) For all i ∈ I, the J columns in the matrix
(ρθ
ij)θ∈Θ,j∈J are linearly independent.
Even when monitoring is truly private, in the sense that ρ
θζ
ij > 0 for all (i,j) ∈
I × J and (θ,ζ) ∈ Θ × Z, reputations can have very powerful short-run effects.
This is established in Theorem 6, which is a minor extension of Fudenberg and
Levine (1992).14
Theorem 6 Suppose the game has imperfect private monitoring satisfying As-
sumptions 5 and 6. Suppose the commitment type plays the pure action i∗ in every
period. For all p0 > 0 and all ε > 0, there exists ¯ δ < 1 such that for all δ1 > ¯ δ,







S (i) = argmax
j∈J
π2 (i,j).
The proof of the following extension of Theorem 1 to the private monitoring
case is essentially identical to that of Theorem 1 apart from the added notational
inconvenience of private signals.
Theorem 7 Suppose the imperfect private monitoring satisﬁes Assumptions 5, 6,
and 7 and ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 4. Then at any Nash equilibrium, pt → 0 ˜ P-
almost surely.
14While Fudenberg and Levine (1992) explicitly assume public monitoring, under Assumption
6, their analysis also covers imperfect private monitoring. This includes games where player 1
observesnoinformativesignal. Insuchacase, whenthereiscompleteinformation, theone-period-
memory strategies that we describe as equilibria in Section 2 of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson
(2004) are also equilibria of the game with private monitoring. We thank Juuso V¨ alim¨ aki for
showing us how to construct such equilibria.July 28, 2004 32
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Since pt → 0 ˜ P-almost surely, we have pt → 1 ˆ P-almost surely. For any ε,ν > 0
there exists a T such that for all t > T, ˜ P(pt > ε) + ˆ P(pt < 1 − ε) < ν. Hence,




[u2(s1,s2) − u2(s1,ξ2(s2,pt))]d(p0ˆ ρt + (1 − p0)˜ ρt)
≤ (1 − p0)
Z
S×[0,ε]




[u2(s1,s2) − u2(s1,ξ2(s2,pt))]dˆ ρt + 2Mν,
where M is an upper bound on the magnitude of the stage-game payoffs and
the ﬁrst inequality follows from (6). As ξ2 is measurable with respect to pt, we
can ensure that the ﬁnal integral in the preceding expression is zero by setting
ξ2(s2,pt) = s2 for pt > ε, and hence, for any ε,ν > 0 and for all ξ2,
Z
S×[0,ε]




Again, because ˜ P(pt > ε) < ν, (A.1) implies
Z
S×[0,1]




Integrating out pt implies that, for all ξ
0









Consider now a convergent subsequence, denoted ˜ µtk with limit ˜ µ∞, and sup-
pose ˜ µ∞ is not a correlated equilibrium. Since (5) holds for all t0, it also holds in
the limit. If ˜ µ∞ is not a correlated equilibrium, it must then be the case that for
some ξ
00





2(s2))]d˜ µ∞ < −κ < 0.July 28, 2004 33









contradicting (A.2) for ν sufﬁciently small.
A.2 Completion of the Proof of Lemma 2
Turning to the general case, let M ≡ maxi∈I,j∈J,`∈{1,2} |π`(i,j)|, so that M is an
upper bound on the magnitude of stage-game payoffs. Let α = εo/6M, where εo
is given by Deﬁnition 5. If Zt ≤ α, player 2’s expected continuation payoffs at h2s
under the strategy proﬁle (˜ σ1, ˆ σ1,σ2) are within 2Mα of his continuation payoff
under the proﬁle (ˆ σ1, ˆ σ1,σ2). Hence, if Zt ≤ α and history h2s (for s ≥ t ≥ T o)
occurs with positive probability, then
 E
(˜ σ1,ˆ σ1,σ2)[π2s | h2s] − E
(ˆ σ1,ˆ σ1,σ2)[π2s | h2s]
  < 2Mα. (A.3)
for all σ2.
We now show that if Zt ≤ α for t ≥ T o, then player 2 plays the pure action
j∗(hs) in all future periods. Suppose instead that the equilibrium σ2 plays j 6=
j∗(hs) with positive probability in period s under a history h2s. Deﬁne σ0
2 to be
identical to σ2 except that, after the history h2s, it places zero probability weight
on the action j∗(hs) and increases the probability of all other actions played by
σ2 by equal weight. Let ˆ σ2 be player 2’s best response to the commitment type.
Then, if Zt ≤ α we have15
E





2)[π2s | h2s] + 2Mα
≤ E
(ˆ σ1,ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2)[π2s | h2s] − ε
o + 2Mα
≤ E
(˜ σ1,ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2)[π2s | h2s] − ε
o + 4Mα.
As 4Mα < εo, ˆ σ2 is a proﬁtable deviation after the history h2s for player 2—
a contradiction. Hence on the event Zt ≤ α player 2 plays j∗(hs) in all future
periods. Equivalently, we have shown {Zt ≤ α} ⊂ Go
t. Choose T ≥ T o such
that pt > η and ˜ E[Zt|H2t] < αξ for all t > T. Condition (8) now follows from
˜ P[{Zt > α} | H2t] < ξ for all t > T on F.
15The equality applies the fact that in equilibrium, player 2 is indifferent between actions played
with positive probability. The ﬁrst inequality applies (A.3). The second inequality applies Deﬁni-
tion 5.1. The third inequality applies (A.3) again.July 28, 2004 34
A.3 Completion of the Proof of Lemma 3
























where h1,z+1 = (h1z,yz,iz). Hence,
|Pr[K|h1,s+τ+1] − Pr[K|h1s]|
≥ Pr[K|h1s]























The left side of this inequality converges to zero ˜ P-almost surely, and hence so
does the right side. Moreover, applying the triangle inequality and rearranging,
we ﬁnd that the right side is larger than
Pr[K|h1s]










    
×
















   
− Pr[K|h1s]



































¿From the induction hypothesis that k ˜ E[σ2z|β (H1s,H2t)] − ˜ E[σ2z|H1s]k con-
verges to zero ˜ P-almost surely for every z ∈ {s,...,s + τ − 1}, the negative term
also converges to zero ˜ P-almost surely. But then the ﬁrst term also converges to
zero, and, as above, the result holds for z = s + τ.July 28, 2004 35
A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Since ˆ σ1 is public, player 2 has a best reply ˆ σ2 that is public, and so player 1 has
a public best reply σ
†
1 to ˆ σ2. By Deﬁnition 5.2, for every s-period public history




1,ˆ σ2) [π1s|hs] > E




1 is a best response to ˆ σ2, player 1’s payoff E(σ
†
1,ˆ σ2) [π1s|hs] is unchanged
if the period-s mixture σ
†
1(hs) is replaced by any other mixture that remains within
the support of σ
†
1(hs), and thereafter play continues according to σ
†
1.
For s > T o and hs ∈ Hs, let Υ(hs) be the set of public histories hs0, s0 ≥ s,
that are continuations of hs and s0 is the ﬁrst period in which there is an action in I
receiving positive probability under ˆ σ1 but receiving zero probability under σ
†
1.16
Note that Υ(hs) is at most countable. In addition, there are no two elements of
Υ(hs) with the property that one is a continuation of the other. For hs0 ∈ Υ(hs),
s0 > s, in period s, every action that receives positive probability under strategy
ˆ σ1 also receives positive probability under σ
†





1,ˆ σ2) [π1s|hs] − E










1,ˆ σ2) [π1,s+1|(hs,i)] − E
(ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2) [π1,s+1|(hs,i)]
i
.












1,ˆ σ2) [π1s0|hs0] − E
(ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2) [π1s0|hs0]
i
(A.5)
where ˆ Q(hs0|hs) is the probability of hs0 given hs under (ˆ σ1, ˆ σ2).17
Choose ˆ τ such that 2Mδ
ˆ τ
1 < εo/3. The terms in (A.5) corresponding to his-
tories longer than s + ˆ τ can then collectively contribute at most εo/3 to the sum.
16Because σ
†
1 is a best response to ˆ σ2, there must exist such histories, since otherwise every
action accorded positive probability by ˆ σ1 would be optimal, contradicting (A.4).
17It is possible that
P
hs0∈Υ(hs) ˆ Q(hs0|hs) < 1. However, expected payoffs under (σ
†
1, ˆ σ2) and
(ˆ σ1, ˆ σ2) are equal after any history not in Υ(hs), and so such histories can then be omitted from
(A.5).July 28, 2004 36
The remaining terms must then sum to at least 2εo/3. Letting Υ(hs;ˆ τ) denote the













1,ˆ σ2) [π1s0|hs0] − E
(ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2) [π1s0|hs0]
i
.




1,ˆ σ2)[π1s0|hs0] − E















∗(hs;ˆ τ)|hs) > q ≡
εo
6M − εo
(the denominator is positive, since Deﬁnition 5 implies εo ≤ 2M).
There are at most Y ˆ τ histories in Υ∗(hs;ˆ τ). In the last period of each such
history, there is an action i ∈ I that is played with positive probability by ˆ σ1 and
zero probability by σ
†
1. Since there are at most I such actions, there is a history
ho
s0(hs) ∈ Υ∗(hs;ˆ τ) and action io(hs) such that, under (ˆ σ1, ˆ σ2), the probability
that the history ho
s0(hs) occurs and is followed by action io(hs) is at least λ ≡






(ˆ σ1,ˆ σ2) [π1s0|h
o
s0] ≤ λE






















A.5 Proof of Lemma 6
We prove only the second and third assertions (the ﬁrst being an immediate impli-
cation of Lemma 5 and the deﬁnitions of i, s0, and h).
Since ω ∈ F †
s and projs(ω0) = projs(ω) implies ω0 ∈ F †
s, for any s-period
public history consistent with a state in F †
s, and any s0-period (s0 > s) publicJuly 28, 2004 37
continuation of that history, there is at least one state in F †
s consistent with that
continuation. Consequently, since every τ period public history has probability at
least ρτ, ˜ P(F ‡
s) ≥ ρτ ˜ P(F †
s) > ρτ(1 − ν) ˜ P(F) > 0.
After any public history, the normal type’s payoffs under (σ
†
1, ˆ σ2) are indepen-
dent of her private histories—she is playing her public best response to a public
strategy. At states in F ‡
s, from Corollary 2, under ˜ σ1, player 1 expects player 2’s
future play (over the periods s,s+1,...,s+2τ) to be within ν of his best response
to the commitment strategy, ˆ σ2. Hence, on F ‡
s, player 1 expects that player 2’s
future play (over the periods s,s + 1,...,s + 2τ) to be within νρ−τ of his best
response to the commitment strategy, ˆ σ2, irrespective of her play in those periods.
Discounted to the period s0 ≤ s + τ, payoffs from periods after s + 2τ can differ
by at most 2Mδ
τ
1. Hence, for states in F ‡
s, and for any σ1,
 E
(σ1,σ2)[π1s0 | H1s0] − E
(σ1,ˆ σ2)[π1s0 | H1s0]













(ˆ σ1,σ2)[(1 − δ1)π(i(ω;s),js0) + δ1π1s0+1|H1s0].
Hence, after the public history h(ω;s), no private history for player 1 (consistent
with F ‡
s) makes playing action i(ω) proﬁtable.
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